Paper on: Strengthening Oversight Ability and
Effectiveness of the Legislatures Presented by Prof Ss Sangweni, Chairperson
of the Public
Service Commission for the National Conference of the Association
of Public
Accounts Committees
04 to 05 October 2004
Mr Chairperson, members of Parliament and provincial
legislatures, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. It
is with great pleasure that I present this paper today on a
topic that forms the core pillar upon which the Public
Service Commission executes its mandate. The Public Service
Commission owes its existence to the need for improved
oversight ability and effectiveness of the legislatures and
continuously strives to improve delivery on its mandate.
Parliamentary oversight in the eyes of the public means
accountability – accountability of public and political
office bearers and institutions. The question therefore
should be, what can be done to improve legislatures’ ability
to ensure public accountability? However, before attempting
to answer that question, I would like to first reflect on
the meaning of public accountability.
Public accountability
Accountability is one of the most important principles
underlying democracy. Public accountability can be viewed as
the defining relationship between the ‘governors’ and the
‘governed’. It forms the basis of a reciprocal
accountability relationship by which the public puts its
trust in politicians and public servants to make decisions
on the kind of society in which they want to live.
Accountability is also broadly defined as the ability to
call public officials, private employers, or service
providers to account, requiring that they be answerable for
their policies, actions, and use of funds .
It is the government’s job to set national standards that
really matter to the public, within a framework of clear
accountability. These standards can only be delivered
effectively by devolution and delegation to the front-line,
giving executive government responsibility and
accountability to deliver. The role of government is to set
the parameters, outcomes and standards which public services
need to achieve.
A report published by the Auditor General of British
Columbia depicted ‘ how levels of accountability and the
elements of operational, financial and compliance
performance can be combined to guide government’s
accountability to legislatures and the citizens.’
|
KEY PERFORMANCE ELEMENTS |
| ACCOUNTABILITY LEVEL |
OPERATIONAL |
FINANCIAL |
COMPLIANCE |
GOVERNMENT-WIDE
|
Is government achieving what it set out to
achieve?
Is government developing and maintaining the
capacity to deliver results in the future? |
Is government achieving its financial
objectives? |
Are government’s affairs conducted in a manner
that complies with legislation and expected
standards of conduct? |
| MINISTRIES (GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS) AND FUNDED
AGENCIES |
Is the department achieving its overall goals?
Are its programmes achieving what they are meant to
achieve in a cost-effective way?
Is the department developing and maintaining the
capacity to deliver results in the future? |
Is the department achieving its financial
objectives? |
Are the department’s affairs conducted in a
manner that complies with legislation and expected
standards of conduct? |
By committing to operating accountability, the Public
Service, in the spirit of Batho Pele, is agreeing to be held
up to public scrutiny so that its decisions and processes
used to reach them can be evaluated and reviewed. This
feature of modern democracies sometimes makes being a public
leader awkward but it is a mechanism that prevents the kinds
of abuses common in totalitarian regimes .
Public accountability in the South African context
In South Africa, sections 92 and 133 of the Constitution,
1996, provide that Members of the Cabinet and Executive
Council of a province are accountable collectively and
individually to Parliament/the legislature for the exercise
of their powers and the performance of their functions.
Members of the Cabinet and Executive Council of a province
must provide Parliament/the legislature with full and
regular reports concerning matters under their control .
The Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (PFMA), provides
that the accounting officer for each department must, when
the annual budget is introduced in the National Assembly,
submit to Parliament measurable objectives for each main
division within the department’s vote. There will
subsequently be a clear contract between Parliament and the
relevant Minister regarding specific deliverables for which
the Minister can be held responsible.
This process is cascaded down to heads of department in
terms of the Public Service Act, 1994, that determines that
heads of department are responsible for the efficient
management and administration of their departments. From
there, heads of department will cascade the process to
senior managers in the department. Senior managers will then
be accountable for the key activities or outputs reflected
in his/her performance agreement. In such a way clearer
accountability is achieved, as the allocation of resources
are aligned to activities and ultimately outcomes to the
public.
Considering that senior managers through their performance
agreements are accountable for aspects of a department’s
business plan it could well be argued that they in addition
to heads of department be made directly accountable to
Parliament/legislatures. Should the approach be adopted the
latter will have to be in possession of all the relevant
information. But then again, some people would be in a
position to provide the information to
Parliament/legislatures in such a manner to conceal or cover
up important facts.
For this reason heads of departments as accounting officers
account to Parliament/legislatures through various documents
that have been put in place to inform
Parliament/legislatures of the performance of departments,
e.g. annual reports and the Auditor-General’s report. The
format for annual reporting has become prescriptive, and
should represent the department’s actual performance
measured against predetermined objectives and the
department’s financial position as at the end of a financial
year. The report also needs to show that moneys have been
spent in accordance with the appropriations and priorities
of Parliament.
In the past, however, annual reports were merely descriptive
citations on activities. In this way pertinent information
on areas of non-delivery could remain undisclosed. As a
result Parliament could only interrogate what is before it.
In order for the oversight ability of legislatures to be
improved, I submit that the following will have to receive
attention:
-
The roles of those who have to account to legislatures
must be clarified
- Performance measurement must be employed as a tool to
enhance accountability
- The effect of statutory bodies must be maximized.
I will briefly touch on each of these areas.
Clarifying the roles of those who have to account to
legislatures
Given the accountability process as outlined where one would
expect that there are clear authority lines and no need for
blurring of roles. Unfortunately, this is not how government
works. Resignations by Directors-General in the South
African context usually draw much attention. Media reports
have explained the real reasons for many of these
resignations as “relationship problems” between the Minister
and his/her relevant Director-General - Directors-General
thinking they are politicians and Ministers interfering in
the administration. Where reasons have been provided by an
affected party this explanation has been confirmed.
With such a clear legal framework, why then does this
problem arise within South Africa. A fundamental problem as
pointed out by the Public Service Commission’s Report on the
State of the Public Service, 2001, is that the legislation
introduced to tighten accountability may “have to some
degree diffused management responsibilities” . In terms of
the Public Service Regulations, the executing authorities
are given the powers to manage human resource management of
public officials. Yet in terms of the PFMA the head of the
department is the accounting officer and is therefore
responsible for financial management in a department. This
creates uncertainty around management accountability.
An analysis of this problem would suggest therefore that the
“relationship problems” between the two is inherent to the
legislative design. Alas, a closer scrutiny would suggest
that the “relationship issues” go deeper than the
interpretation of the legislature which gives rise to
inherent tensions. This does not suggest that one can ignore
the importance of a good working relationship between the
two parties. As Osbaldeston has indicated where such a
relationship exists the accountability system functions
well. Both have appreciation for the responsibility roles of
each.
The Weberian model of “politicians decide, officials carry
out” belies the complex environment and the many
complexities that a Director-General faces. While the
Directors-General role has been variously described as the
interface, the buffer, the technician and the specialist,
what is clear is that this position is “inescapably caught
between the partisan political world of the minister and the
national, impartial and scientific world of the public
servant” .
This is exacerbated by a demanding environment with
competing interests and overlapping accountabilities. “The
pace of change in the public service… has been so vast and
profound that very few people outside the public sector yet
realise the depth of these changes” . There is a myriad of
stakeholders to whom they must account to. “They must look
upward to their political superiors, laterally to their
administrative peers and downwards to their departmental
subordinate” . This does not even take into account the
independent statutory bodies they have to account to such as
the Auditor-General and the Public Service Commission.
Clearly there needs to be more refocusing and repositioning
towards a greater clarification of roles and
responsibilities of the parties. A greater understanding of
roles allows for a better management of this delicate
relationship. As new Ministers and new Directors-General are
appointed there needs to be clear guidelines and orientation
to assist each to understand their respective roles.
The Public Service Commission is the lead agency in three
projects emanating from Cabinet’s Governance and
Administration cluster to address this very need. The first
project deals with the role clarification between the
executive and heads of department. The second is
investigating means to strengthen the support capacity for
members of the executive whilst the third endeavors to
provide an explicit accountability framework.
Performance measurement as a tool to enhance accountability
Any accountability system requires feedback. Feedback from
the Minister to the Director-General and vise versa.
Likewise, feedback information from the environment to the
organisation. If the Director-General bears the greater
responsibility in terms of managing, then surely the
Minister carries the weight in respect of the provision of
regular and qualitative feedback. An effective Performance
Management System should function on the basis of regular
feedback. Ministers are not wont to practise this but it is
important for the Director-General to have feedback on
his/her performance.
Two-thirds of permanent secretaries in a Commonwealth
Secretariat questionnaire said “they receive no regular work
evaluation, and that they find this very frustrating”. In
the South African situation, a Public Service Commission
report revealed that out of 36 national Heads of
Departments, only 12 were evaluated for the 2000/2001
financial year by means of the prescribed evaluation
framework. This was seen as disappointing as it “is not a
sound practice given practical administrative problems
associated with this. This report upheld the “principle of
regular evaluation and performance feedback”.
A head of department’s performance agreement forms his or
her contract to deliver on the business plan of the
department. The business plan sets out in detail the
political and therefore public expectations for the
department. Performance assessments based on the performance
agreements of heads of department enhances the
accountability process by measuring achievement against
agreed objectives. The Public Service Commission manages the
evaluation process of heads of department and reports on an
annual basis to Parliament and the legislatures on key
issues emanating from the evaluation cycle. Information
obtained during the evaluation process also informs the
Public Service Commission’s annual report on the State of
the Public Service. Both these reports are important tools
for legislatures in performing their oversight role in terms
of the Public Service. Areas where intervention is required
can be identified and legislatures can call departments to
account .
A report is in the process of being finalized by the
Commission on the second year of HoD evaluations.
Preliminary findings show an improvement in the number of
HoDs that have been evaluated. A matter that has, however,
recurred is the fact that the PSC is approached by HoDs for
advice on the outcome of the evaluation process despite
letters to Ministers indicating that they must provide
feedback. There is therefore a definite need for the
executive to appreciate the need to provide performance
feedback
Maximising the impact of statutory bodies
The Constitution, 1996 has created institutions with the
explicit intent to enhance the oversight ability and
effectiveness of the legislatures. I would like to focus on
the Auditor-General and the Public Service Commission.
The Auditor-General is the key institution promoting
accountability in South Africa’s Public Sector. Widely
regarded as having performed well, the Auditor-General is a
central pillar of our democracy . Section 188(1)(a) of the
Constitution provides that the Auditor-General must audit
and report on the accounts, financial statements and
financial management of all national and provincial state
departments and administrations. Auditing includes
performance auditing of the economic use of resources and
the efficiency and effectiveness of departments. In terms of
section 40(2) of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA),
1999, the Auditor-General must audit the financial
statements and submit an audit report on those statements to
the accounting officer within two months upon receipt of the
statements.
In terms of section 40(1)(d) of the PFMA, the accounting
officer for a department must, within five months of the end
of a financial year, submit-
[a] an annual report on the activities of that department
during that financial year;
[b] the financial statements for that financial year after
those statements have been audited; and
[c] the Auditor-General’s report on those statements.
The annual report must fairly present the state of affairs
on the department, its business, its financial results, its
performance against predetermined objectives and its
financial position as at the end of the financial year
concerned. Given that these reports contain the
Auditor-General’s assessment of the department’s handling of
public finances and the fact that the department’s
performance against set objectives are reflected, it becomes
a very important tool in the hands of legislatures in
performing its oversight role.
In addition to the annual reports on the financial
statements of departments, the Auditor-General also reports
from time to time on matters emanating from its mandate to
legislatures. Once again these reports are important
instruments available to legislatures in executing its
oversight responsibility by calling those implicated in the
reports to account.
Unfortunately recommendations made by the Auditor-General
are not always implemented and there is a worrying incidence
of matters reported in Auditor-General reports being
repeated year after year . The PSC can confirm this tendency
through its experience in the HoD evaluation process. In
many instances HoDs are referred, during questioning, to
comments made in the Auditor-general’s report of the
previous year which again appears in the current year’s
report.
The Public Service Commission plays a very important
monitoring and evaluation role in the sphere of Public
Administration. In terms of the Constitution, 1996 the
Public Service Commission is authorized to investigate and
evaluate the application of personnel and public
administration practices, and to report to the relevant
executive authority and legislature. In addition, the
Commission must report at least once a year to the National
Assembly; and in respect of its activities in a province, to
the legislature of that province.
The reports that emanate from the activities of the Public
Service Commission provide valuable information to the
legislatures in fulfilling its oversight role. The Public
Service Commission addresses the whole spectrum of public
administration through its investigations and its monitoring
and evaluation activities.
Certain of the reports emanating from the Commission are
department specific and therefore provide individual
portfolio committees with information that they can
follow-up by requesting the departments involved to account.
However, many of the reports reflect on the management of
public administrative practices across the public service.
These reports are, in opinion, not optimally used by
legislatures. Most of these reports, despite the width of
scope, reflect on findings relating to individual
departments as well. All committees of the legislatures
should carefully scrutinize these reports, with a view to
calling departments to account in respect of
maladministration/deficiencies identified. Examples of such
reports include:
-
Report on sick leave trends in the Public Service.
- Report on the state of representativeness in the Public
Service.
- Investigation into the re-employment of persons retired
due to ill-health.
Many of the investigations conducted by the Commission
emanates from requests by executing authorities and heads of
department. Given its role in supporting legislatures with
their oversight role it is disappointing that a limited
number of investigations have emanated from requests from
legislatures. In the history of the Public Service
Commission only two investigations emanated from requests
from the legislatures namely:
-
An investigation into the management information used to
monitor sick leave.
- An investigation into dismissals as a result of
misconduct.
Through the multitude of reports submitted to legislatures
on an annual basis – whether from departments, executing
authorities, statutory bodies or even the media – issues
impacting on effective and efficient public administration
should be identifiable. The different committees of
legislatures should interact with the Commission on those
areas where they believe further investigation is warranted.
Conclusion
The topic under discussion is of such a nature that a
ten-minute presentation can hardly do justice to the issues
that need to be considered. I trust, however, that the areas
that I have touched on will ignite debate on how public
accountability can be improved.
I thank you
Prof SS Sangweni
Chairperson of the Public Service Commission
References
- Public management and policy association report, 2004
- British Columbia, Auditor General. Deputy Minister’s
Council. Enhancing Accountability for Performance: A
Framework and an Implementation Plan. Second joint report.
April 1996.
- Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
- Evaluation of Department’s annual reports as an
accountability mechanism. Public Service Commission. October
1999.
- http://www.worldbank.org. Empowerment and Poverty Reduction
Sourcebook, Worldbank, 2002.
- Kerganaghan, K. and Siegel, D. Public Administration in
Canada. 1995 Scarborough, ON: Nelson Canada.
- Larson, E, Coe, A. Managing Change. The Evolving Role of Top
Public Servants. Managing the Public Service Strategies for
Improvement Series: No. Commonwealth Secretariat.
- Massé, Marcel. “Public Service Reform and the Changing Role
of the Permanent Secretary”. Paper presented to the Second
Annual Commonwealth Seminar on the Changing Role of the
Permanent Secretary, Ottawa, June 1998.
- Public Service Commission. Report on the State of the Public
Service. November 2001.
- Public Service Commission. State of the Public Service
Report, 2004.
- Report on the Implementation of the Framework for the
Evaluation of HODs. Public Service Commission. November 2002
- The Public Finance Management Act. Act 1 of 1999 (as amended
by Act 29 of 1999).
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